The command resignation of General Stanley McChrystal marks a sad day for the American military. His leadership in the Afghan theater is needed now more than ever, as the war may well be at its tipping point with the current fighting in the Kandahar region. But his and his staff’s comments regarding the commander-in-chief are simply unacceptable from a military man such as McChrystal.
Talented generals often struggle with what they consider to be inept civilians trying to control military matters. Still they are honor bound not to publicly acknowledge such frustrations or to deride their superior commanders. Just as Truman was forced to relieve MacArthur, Obama had to sack McChrystal, even at such an inauspicious time.
We should take the president’s words at face value when he says that it is “with considerable regret” that he has relieved General McChrystal. The general was Obama’s first choice for the Afghan command and he deserves credit for choosing an able man for the job. The general’s mouth, not his performance has cost him his job.
While not forgiving his actions, we must question what circumstances led to the insubordination of such a highly decorated career soldier. Obviously McChrystal must have maintained a certain level of arrogance to allow a journalist already known to be critical the war effort to pierce the veil of his inner circle. Yet there must also have been a great level of frustration he wished to voice as well.
Such frustration is warranted. It has been less than a year since McChrystal asked President Obama for 40,000 more troops to be given to him post haste. Instead of delivering, the president played politics. Still fresh off of a campaign in which he promised a July 2011 withdrawal from Afghanistan, the president apparently did not want to seem to backslide on such promises.
The president did nothing for almost three months, and when he finally to McChrystal’s request it was to give him 30,000, not 40,000, more men. To put this in perspective, it is not as if those 10,000 men were desperately needed elsewhere. We have a million and half men on active duty and the same number in the reserves with fewer than 90,000 soldiers are currently deployed in Iraq. Such dithering and undercutting was a classic case of placing political interests over national security. The delay and lack of manpower may well have cost the American troops the all important initiative, a critical element in combating any guerrilla campaign. McChrystal had a right to disdain such political machinations.
In the end we are lucky to have a General Petraeus waiting in the wings to take over in such a situation. He is a more than adequate replacement for General McChrystal who is known to be particularly tight lipped. This situation will probably serve to further inculcate the values of respect and subordination in the country’s next wave of military leaders. Maybe it will also let the President know he needs to trust his generals more and play his political games less.
